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Abstract
Investor protection regimes have been shown to partly explain why the same type of corporate event
may attract di¤erent investor reactions across countries. We compare the value e¤ects of large bank
merger announcements in Europe and the US and nd an inverse relationship between the level of
investor protection prevalent in the target country and abnormal returns that bidders realize during the
announcement period. Accordingly, bidding banks realize higher returns when targeting low protection
economies (most European economies) than bidders targeting institutions which operate under a high
investor protection regime (the US). We argue that bidding bank shareholders need to be compensated
for an increased risk of expropriation by insiders which they face in a low protection environment where
takeover markets are illiquid and there are high private benets of control.
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1 Introduction
Recent empirical work has proposed that the legal and regulatory environment of a country can help
explain di¤erent investor reactions to similar-type events (Rossi and Volpin, 2004; Moeller and
Schlingemann, 2005). For a sample of 204 bank mergers between 1996 and 2004, this study compares
the acquirer returns associated with US and European bank merger announcements and demonstrates
that more sophisticated investor protection laws in the target country lower the returns that bidders
earn in the takeover market. Given that the value of completed nancial sector M&A was more than
$6 trillion over the past twenty years (Thomson Financial) and given the pivotal role of banks as the
main providers of corporate nance and governance advice to the rms which they fund, establishing a
clearer understanding of investor reactions to bank mergers is important. In an e¢ cient market, where
assets are priced rationally, the revaluation e¤ects of bank merger announcements may serve as an
accurate assessment of the net benets that shareholders can extract from a proposed transaction.
However, knowledge accumulation about the antecedents of value creation for US and European bank
M&A remains patchy (Amel et al., 2004).
The literature examining the shareholder wealth implications of the market for corporate control has
repeatedly reported investor skepticism about any gains associated with US-focused bank mergers.
James and Weir (1987), Houston and Ryngaert (1994), DeLong (2001), Cornett et al. (2003), Anderson
et al. (2004), DeLong and DeYoung (2007), and others examine the initial investor reaction to bank
merger announcements and nd bidding bank shareholders realize losses in the order of 2%. In Europe,
by contrast, studies tend to nd more favorable market reactions to bank consolidation. Beitel et al.
(2004), Lepetit et al. (2004), and Karceski et al. (2005) o¤er evidence that European bank M&A has no
e¤ect on rm value, while others report that bidder returns associated with bank acquisitions in Europe
are only marginally negative (Campa and Hernando, 2006) or even positive (Cybo-Ottone and Murgia,
2000). To date, there is no convincing explanation for what might drive di¤erent investor reactions to
bank mergers in Europe and the US. In this paper, we argue that systemic di¤erences in law and
regulation between countries as encapsulated in investor protection regimes partially determine investor
expectations about the value-creating potential of a bank merger at the time of its announcement.
Dyck and Zingales (2004) point out that investor protection creates and destroys opportunities for
expropriation of outside investors (creditors and minority shareholders) by insiders (managers and
majority shareholders). This is because investor protection determines the value of the private benets
of control that insiders may enjoy. Depending on the degree of agency conict, expropriations by
insiders can take forms of varying severity (La Porta et al., 2000; Morck et al., 1990) ranging from
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asset stripping to wasteful behavior such as value-destroying acquisition strategies. However, when
investors see their claims protected by the law and enforceable through the legal system, demand for
certain types of nancial assets is likely to increase (Hope, 2003), thus, facilitating the development of
di¤erent governance systems. La Porta et al. (2002) nd that countries with more elaborate disclosure
and accounting rules have more valuable stock markets and more IPOs (market-based governance),
while countries with stronger creditor protection laws have larger credit markets (bank-based
governance).
Rossi and Volpin (2004) provide a link between governance systems and the market for corporate
control a vital element of market-based governance which acts to replace failing management (Kini et
al., 2004; James and Weir, 1987). The authors observe increased levels of takeover market activity and
a higher propensity for bidding wars in countries with more elaborate shareholder protection rights,
possibly because these regimes facilitate a more freely-operating market for corporate control. Moeller
and Schlingemann (2005) nd that acquisition targets operating within more liquid takeover markets
diminish the announcement period returns that bidding shareholders realize. For a sample of
cross-border deals involving targets in the UK, Canada, France and Germany, the authors show that
acquisitions of UK companies attract the least favorable market reaction. They attribute the low bidder
returns for UK acquisitions to lower agency conict in markets where targets benet from sophisticated
shareholder protection rights as well to a higher likelihood of bidding wars for attractive targets causing
merger-related gains to be bid away. By the same token, Starks and Wei (2004) argue that bidders have
to pay higher premiums for targets located in relatively more sophisticated protection environments in
an e¤ort to compensate target shareholders for poorer governance practices following mergers.1
The evidence on the valuation e¤ects of mergers in di¤erent investor protection regimes is rather
limited for banking rms. DeLong (2003), in an international sample of bank merger activity, nds
higher abnormal returns for a portfolio of non-US acquirers (including Japanese and European banks)
vis-à-vis bidding banks in the US. While the author suggests that this result is driven by underlying
di¤erences in nancial systems, she does not control for the impact of investor protection on her
1Rather than the negative value e¤ect of investor protection in the targets country on bidder returns hypothesized in
this study, the opposite e¤ect is also conceivable. Dahlquist et al. (2003), for example, argue that bidders may be
rewarded for acquisitions in high protection economies owing to the higher company disclosure standards as well as lower
agency and transaction costs associated with M&A in these regulatory environments. While Bris and Cabolis (2004) nd
some evidence consistent with this in a sample of cross-border mergers the authors detect higher bidder returns for M&A
targeted at companies in countries where corruption is less widespread they do not nd bidder returns to increase with
more general measures of investor protection (such as creditor or shareholder rights).
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ndings. Similarly, Kiymaz (2004) reports that the wealth e¤ects for bidding institutions vary with the
location of the target. In a sample of cross-border acquisitions made by US nancial rms, deals
targeted at nancial institutions in Latin America and East Asia lead to higher value gains for bidding
rms. Again, di¤erences in investor protection are not among the conditions examined by the author.
Our ndings can be summarized as follows. The main nding of the paper is a negative market
reaction to bidders that leverage acquisitions valued at more than $100 million in the context of high
investor protection regimes (i.e. the US and UK), while bidders targeting low protection environments
(i.e. most European economies) realize positive abnormal returns. We interpret our nding of negative
bidder announcement returns to deals where targets operate under a high investor protection regime as
evidence of acquirers nding it di¢ cult to capture acquisition-related gains from a target in the liquid
(and, hence, competitive) takeover markets associated with this type of corporate governance system
(see La Porta et al., 2002; Moeller and Schlingemann, 2005). Accordingly, the bidder losses signal a
favorable stock market assessment of the e¢ ciency of internal governance and external control
mechanisms employed by target institutions. Conversely, in low investor protection environments, a less
freely-operating market for corporate control lets bidders earn superior announcement returns by
compensating them for the higher private benets of control, as well as higher agency and information
asymmetry costs.
We also nd that bidding bank losses in the context of activity-diversifying bank mergers are more
prevalent when targeted at European rather than at US institutions. We suggest that this is because
nancial conglomeration increases investor concerns over their ability to assess the true value of a target
and the synergistic benets of a proposed transaction if the targets disclosure practices are weak.
Further, investor preference for cash-nanced bank mergers is particularly strong in Europe, thus,
reecting the higher risk of expropriation associated with equity in a low investor protection
environment. Also, we nd evidence that European cross-border M&A creates bidder wealth if
acquisition targets are located in a less sophisticated protection environment than their acquirers.
Finally, another contribution of our paper is that we can shed some light on the di¤erent value e¤ects
surrounding bank mergers in Europe and the US which to date have largely been left unaccounted for
in the bank merger literature.
In two recent papers related to ours, Bris and Cabolis (2004) and Starks and Wei (2004) examine
the value e¤ects of cross-border mergers. Both papers nd that changes in targetsinvestor protection
regimes the distinctive feature of cross-border M&A generate statistically signicant valuation
e¤ects. However, our approach di¤ers in two aspects: First, we do not restrict our analysis to
cross-border deals and, hence, argue that any e¤ect of target rm protection laws on bidder returns
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exists independently of targets switching regimes in the post-merger period. For instance, a US acquirer
seeking to bid for an Italian credit institution will be equally concerned about the targets governance
arrangements (including the possibility of expropriation by insiders or bidding wars) as an Italian
bidder when seeking acquisitions in Italy. Second, because our analysis is not concerned with target
returns,2 we e¤ectively examine the expected value gains that bidders may extract from M&A in
di¤erent economic environments. In this context, a targets level of investor protection (which may or
may not be identical to that of the acquirer) proxies the overall benets and costs associated with
acquisition activities that bidding banks are likely to encounter in di¤erent legal environments across
which the e¤ectiveness of governance and disclosure practices may vary greatly.
The following section introduces the bank merger sample and research methodology. Subsequently,
univariate tests are presented to gauge the market valuation e¤ects of bank mergers in Europe and the
US by deal type and by level of investor protection before the ndings of cross-sectional analyses are
discussed.
2 Data and Methodology
2.1 M&A Data
Our sample of bank mergers was obtained from Thomson Financials M&A database (SDC Platinum).
In order to be sampled, a merger must have been announced between 1996 and 2004. We refer to the
year of the deal announcement as the year of the merger or acquisition. Only transactions that have
been completed as of 31 May 2005 were included in the sample. Both acquirers and targets are listed in
the US or Europe (i.e. EU-15 countries plus Switzerland). While acquirers are commercial banks, bank
holding companies and credit institutions, targets may also be insurance companies (life and non-life),
mortgage bankers, as well as security brokers. This enables us to assess the performance e¤ects of
consolidation across di¤erent nancial product markets. While we use the terms merger and acquisition
2We follow previous research (e.g., James and Weir, 1987; Rossi and Volpin, 2004; DeLong, 2003; Campa and
Hernando, 2006) by not examining the returns that target shareholders realize. However, on a theoretical level, we expect
target shareholders to realize higher abnormal announcement returns in more advanced investor protection environments
where more developed capital markets, with more hostile takeovers and bidding wars (La Porta et al., 2002), drive up
acquisition premiums (Moeller and Schlingemann, 2005). Also, we expect wealth transfers from bidding to target bank
shareholders to be more pronounced for acquisitions motivated by managerial hubris (i.e. when bidding managers
overestimate the value creating potential of M&A) or, equally, by entrenchment (e.g. when managers favor corporate
growth over protability). Acquisitions are more likely to lead to lower value gains for target shareholders, on the other
hand, when acquisitions are made in low protection environments (Bris and Cabolis, 2004) or are purely synergy-oriented.
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interchangeably throughout this study, we only included majority acquisitions which resulted in the
acquirer having a stake of at least 50% in a target institution. Finally, for reasons of data availability,
we restricted the sample to transactions with an underlying deal value of at least $100 million in
constant 2004 $.
We reduced our initial sample of 313 bank mergers after omitting cases for one of the following
reasons: (i) share prices are not available on Datastream, (ii) the target is a failing institution (and the
transaction is, thus, involuntary) or (iii) there are less than 90 trading days in between separate merger
announcements made by the same bidder. We retain serial acquirers in our sample as a sizable share of
M&A activities is due to a small number of serial acquirers whose exclusion would forestall
opportunities to analyze this large and very relevant share of bank M&A.
[Table 1]
Table 1 presents our nal bank merger sample. Panel A shows that while the US was responsible for
most of the M&A activity over the sample period, the mean value of acquisitions made by European
banks was higher in almost every sample year. Accordingly, European banks account for 26% of the
number of M&A deals, but for 35% of the overall value of M&A activity during the sample period. The
smaller average deal values in the US are the legacy of regulatory restrictions on the geographic scope
and product mix of local banks that had not been completely lifted before the mid-nineties (Group of
Ten, 2001).
The geographic composition of the sample is given by Panel B of Table 1. The US dominates the
sampled transactions with 151 acquisitions, while 53 deals are of European origin. However, the
predominance of US merger activity in our sample does not permit any conclusions as to the general
pace of bank consolidation in Europe. The consolidation of bank assets in countries like Germany,
France and Italy over the period of study has largely involved non-listed public sector and cooperative
institutions. These institutions face increasing pressures to consolidate as a result of declines in
government ownership and the phasing out of public guarantees of their liabilities (CEPR, 2005) as well
as because of monetary integration across most parts of the EU (Allen and Song, 2005).3
3For a general overview of the main forces which have driven consolidation in the EU, see CEPR (2005). Berger et al.
(1999) provide an extensive discussion of similar issues for the US market.
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2.2 Investor Protection
We proxy the level of investor protection by two indexes developed by La Porta et al. (1998). First, we
use an index of anti-director rights that are prevalent in the target institutions country and bolster the
interests of shareholders against those of management. This measure revolves around voting procedures
for the election of directors and the approval of major corporate issues (see Table 2). Based on six
di¤erent anti-director rights, the index varies from 0 to 6 with higher numbers indicating better
protection for shareholders from expropriation by management. We follow Rossi and Volpin (2004) and
multiply the anti-director index by a measure of the rule of law which rates the law and order tradition
in the target country (also taken from La Porta et al., 1998); the resulting variable is labeled
shareholder protection.4
[Table 2]
The second index measures the quality of national accounting standards. This index reects the
inclusion of 90 accounting items in national practices and, thus, ranges from 0 to 90 where higher values
indicate better investor protection. Accounting standards are at the core of corporate governance
because they make company disclosures interpretable and contracts between investors and management
(which tend to rely on some measure of company size or protability) meaningful (La Porta et al., 2000).
Panel B of Table 2 presents the country scores for both investor protection measures. Out of the
sample countries, common-law countries (the UK & the US) exhibit very high standards of investor
protection, while Italy, Germany and Belgium (civil-law countries) score relatively low in this respect.
As for the quality of accounting standards, Table 2 suggests that Sweden, the UK and the US have
leading positions while corporate disclosure practices lack transparency in Portugal, Greece and Austria.
[Table 3]
Although the two investor protection indices measure somewhat di¤erent institutional
characteristics, there is a strong association between the two measures. First, this is evident in a strong
correlation between shareholder protection and accounting quality (r=0.79; signicant at 1%). Second,
Table 3 classies deals relative to the samples median values of shareholder protection and accounting
quality and shows that both measures consistently describe target countriesprotection levels as either
4While this index does not change over time, we do not expect the underlying variables to vary greatly over the
sample period. Relatively few deals occurred after the passing of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002 which, if anything, only
reinforced the position of the US as a high investor protection economy.
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above- or below-median for most transactions (196 or 96%). Only in eight cases do the two measures
come to a conicting assessment when acquisitions that are targeted at above-median accounting
environments are classied as below-median in terms of shareholder protection. For instance, this is the
case for both Switzerland and Germany where there is a combination of relatively weak investor
protection laws and strong law enforcement that is common to civil-law countries and reected in the
high accounting standards measure.
2.3 Methodology
To analyze investor reactions to bank M&A, we employ a market model of abnormal returns (ARit)
which assumes a linear relationship between the expected return on security i (Rit) and the return on a
market portfolio (Rmt):
ARit = Rit   a^i   ^iRmt: (1)
We calculate abnormal shareprice performance for di¤erent time periods surrounding the announcement
date supplied by Thomson Financial. Market model parameters are estimated using 100-day daily
return observations starting from 121 days to 21 days before the acquisition announcement. Market
returns are based on the national bank-sector indexes provided by Datastream. When determining
statistical signicance, we follow Dodd and Warner (1983) and standardize abnormal returns by the
square root of their estimation period return variance (^i):
SARit = ARit
,
^i
vuuut1 + 1Li + (Rmt   Rm)2LiP
m=1
(Rmt   Rm)2
: (2)
This procedure prevents securities with large variances from dominating the test. Subsequently, we use
the abnormal return statistics reported in Boehmer et al. (1991) to correct for increases in the variance
of abnormal returns that is common for merging parties at announcement. Failure to account for
event-induced increases in variance leaves tests misspecied, while there is only a small loss of statistical
power associated with using the following procedure if historic and event window variance are identical
(Cowan and Sergeant, 1996),
SARt =
vuut nX
i=1
 
SARit  
nX
i=1
SARit/n
!2,
n (n  1): (3)
This yields the following test statistic:
z =
nX
i=1
SARit/n
SARt
: (4)
As a robustness test, we account for the non-normal distribution of security returns by using a sign test
as suggested in Corrado (1989) to detect abnormal share price performance. The use of non-parametric
test statistics makes inferences less sensitive to the e¤ects of outliers.
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3 Empirical Results: Bidder Abnormal Returns
Table 4 presents the cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) associated with di¤erent event window
specications during the announcement period of bank mergers. Bidding bank shareholders realize
negative abnormal returns over the various event window lengths reported. For example, on the day of
the acquisition announcement (t=0), mean abnormal returns are -0.93% against the national bank
sector index (statistically signicant at the 1% level according to both the t statistic and the rank
test). Collectively, the results indicate that investors are skeptical about acquirers gaining from bank
M&A even though the magnitude of abnormal shareprice performance is less pronounced over longer
examination periods. Mean abnormal returns for the 3-, 5- and 11-day periods are -0.50%, -0.32% and
-0.18%, respectively. Our results for 26-day CAR (-0.12%), by comparison, are ambiguous with the
rank statistic signicant, but not the t test.
[Table 4]
Next, we consider the value implications of bank merger activities in the context of di¤erent investor
protection environments and di¤erent types of deals. The following section presents preliminary ndings
on how the laws and regulation prevalent in target countries explain bidder returns in Europe and the
US, before we consider the specic e¤ects of activity diversication, geographic diversication and
takeover nance.
3.1 Announcements Returns and Investor Protection
If investor protection regimes impact a priori expectations about the value-creating potential of a
proposed transaction, we expect bank merger announcements targeting European credit institutions to
elicit a di¤erent market reaction than merger announcements aimed at US banks. This is because the
competitive bidding conditions associated with targets in high protection economies such as the US may
severely restrict the ability of bidders to extract gains from acquisitions (see Rossi and Volpin, 2004;
Moeller and Schlingemann, 2005). Consequently, we hypothesize that US bidders (because they tend to
target US institutions) realize abnormal returns that are negative on average. Low investor protection
environments, on the other hand, su¤er from increased agency conict and, thus, exhibit less liquid
markets for corporate control (La Porta et al., 1998). European bidders are likely to benet from
subdued competition levels for attractive acquisition targets by gaining access to higher abnormal
returns in the takeover market than those bidders that predominantly target high protection economies.
Panel A of Table 5 shows that roughly three-quarters of bank M&A stem from acquirers located in
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the US. The dominance of US bidders in our sample is due to continued overcapacity in the US retail
banking industry a direct result of restrictions on inter-state banking that were kept intact until the
1994 Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and E¢ ciency Act. Further, non-listed institutions (for which
abnormal returns cannot be estimated) play a key role in the consolidation of the European banking
industry. France and Italy, for example, each have sizable cooperative banking sectors, and savings
banks lead the retail banking sector in Germany.
[Table 5]
In line with prior expectations, Panel A of Table 5 documents a positive market revaluation for
European bank acquirers and value losses for US bidders in the merger announcement period. Mean
abnormal returns to European bidders are a positive and signicant 0.36% on the announcement day
and a smaller (yet according to the t-test still statistically signicant) 0.09% and 0.08% over the 3- and
5-day period. While the insignicance of the rank statistic for 3- and 5-day CAR may be due to the fact
that non-parametric tests often struggle to detect small levels of abnormal share price performance
(Cowan and Sergeant, 1996), a major nding is that, in contrast to US transactions, bidding bank
shareholders in Europe do not realize any statistically signicant wealth losses as a result of bank M&A.
The losses pertaining to US investors range from -1.40% on the announcement day to -0.14% for 26-day
CAR (all signicant at 1%). Most critically, the last row in Panel A of Table 5 conrms that the
abnormal returns of European bank merger announcements are signicantly higher than those
associated with US acquisitions a result which is signicant for all event window specications. While
the positive CAR for European bidding banks are consistent with the ndings of Cybo-Ottone and
Murgia (2000), this study is the rst to show that bidders in Europe realize higher announcement
returns than US institutions using a direct comparison of the value e¤ects of M&A activities in both
geographic regions.
To explore the impact of investor protection applicable to targets on bidder wealth directly, Panel B
of Table 5 ranks the full sample into ten portfolios based on the magnitude of the 5-day abnormal
returns that bidders realize. Consistent with the notion that merger-related gains may easily be bid
away in the type of competitive takeover markets prevalent in high protection environments, we observe
that acquisitions in the lowest return decile occur in countries where targets enjoy one of the highest
levels of investor protection (as measured in terms of both shareholder protection and accounting
quality). By the same token, bidder returns are especially pronounced where targets operate in low
protection environments. In low protection environments, investors may demand compensation for
lower governance standards and a higher risk of expropriation by insiders. Tests of the equality of
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means conrm statistically signicant di¤erences in both target protection measures between the top,
middle and bottom return portfolio.
3.2 Product Diversication and Investor Protection
Recent regulatory changes in the US (above all, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999) repealed
boundaries between di¤erent types of nancial services such as banking and insurance as well as
between retail and investment banking (Berger et al., 1999). Legal harmonization within the EU rst
in the form of national big bangs(e.g. in Britain when commercial banks were permitted to acquire
brokerage houses in 1986) and subsequently at EU-level (above all, the Second Banking Directive of
1989 which permitted universal banking throughout Europe) encouraged nancial conglomeration by
allowing consolidation across di¤erent types of institutions (Allen and Song, 2005).
Previous research ndings lead us to make two predictions. First, investors will generally be
skeptical about cost e¢ ciencies resulting from product diversifying bank mergers. DeLong (2001),
Ramaswamy (1997), and Beitel et al. (2004) nd that diversifying bank M&A lead to value losses. It is
commonly argued that while diversication may yield gains from cross-selling di¤erent nancial
products (economies of scope), such gains are considerably smaller than the potential cost reductions
and e¢ ciency improvements associated with product focusing bank mergers (economies of scale). On
the other hand, there are caveats to the negative view of product diversication. Very few studies have
incorporated data after the deregulation of product diversifying bank mergers in Europe and the US
and the type of large credit institutions that have formed recently may be best suited to reap any
merger-related benets (see Berger and Mester, 1997). Our second prediction is that bidding bank
shareholders will be especially wary of product diversifying bank mergers in low protection
environments. It is conceivable that bidders nd it more di¢ cult to assess the true value of a target and
the synergistic benets of a proposed transaction if the disclosure practices of the target are weak.
Additionally, diversication strategies bear an increased risk for bidding shareholders of expropriation
by insiders (Morck et al., 1990; Denis et al., 1997). For example, in low protection economies, bidding
bank managers may engage in empire-building strategies when committing to value-destroying bank
mergers in order to lower both the variance of company returns and their employment risk (Cornett et
al., 2003; Anderson et al., 2004).
Following Campa and Hernando (2004) and Doukas and Kan (2006), we classify deals as diversifying
if the rst two digits of the SIC code of the main industry of the institutions involved in a deal are not
identical. Accordingly, a bank (SIC 60_) acquiring a broker (SIC 62_) is regarded as a diversifying
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merger, while deals between state banks (SIC 6021) and commercial banks (SIC 6029) are classied as
product-focusing.5
[Table 6]
Table 6 reports abnormal returns for deals that are focusing and diversifying along product lines.
Results are presented for the full sample as well as for the subsets of European and US deals. First, we
nd that product diversication, generally, attracts negative abnormal returns the only exceptions are
European deals over the 1-, 3-and 5-day event window where the abnormal returns associated with
diversifying M&A are positive (signicant t-statistic, insignicant rank statistic).6 However, somewhat
unexpectedly, the losses in bidder wealth following the announcement of diversifying mergers are
smaller than the losses that result from focusing bank M&A. For the full sample, diversifying mergers
lead to mean abnormal returns of -0.03% over the 3-day event window (signicant t-statistic,
insignicant rank statistic) compared with -0.61% for focusing deals (signicant at 1%). This nding is
consistent with bancassurance and other forms of cross-selling nancial products having some
performance-enhancing e¤ect albeit at a small level. We refer to the di¤erence in abnormal returns
between diversifying and focusing bank M&A as the value e¤ectof product diversication. For the full
sample, the magnitude of this e¤ect is 1.14% and 0.57% over the 1- and 3-day event window,
respectively (all signicant at less than 5%). The e¤ect is even larger for US bidders over the same
observation periods (1.45% and 0.61%, signicant at 1%). Critically, however, no value e¤ect of product
diversication can be found when diversifying M&A are announced in European banking as none of the
5While SIC codes do not always accurately reect the activities of nancial rms (see DeLong, 2001), we carefully
examined each deal to avoid issues of misclassication. As a robustness check, we used a second measure of diversication
that is, arguably, more suitable to account for the nature of some sample banks as integrated nancial rms that engage
in multiple activities and, hence, have more than one applicable SIC code. We follow Sirower (1997) and examine the
number of industry classication codes shared between bidders and targets. We then classify deals as diversifying if
bidders and targets do not share any SIC codes. The results when using this measure of diversication are practically
identical to the results reported in this section.
6Studies such as Berger et al. (1999) and Berger and Mester (1997) suggest that recent changes in regulation and the
increasing scale of credit institutions have made product diversication more protable. In unreported tests, we test
whether this holds for our sample. We are unable to nd any evidence that the value e¤ect of diversication is more
pronounced for M&A valued at more than $1 billion in either Europe or the US. On the other hand, we cannot reliably
test whether product diversication creates bidder value before and after the passing of the Gramm-Leach Bliley Act
(GLBA) as these transactions were extremely rare. While US banks could engage in securities activities through so-called
section 20subsidiaries during the pre-GLBA period of the sample (provided these activities did not exceed 25% of the
BHCs revenue), there were only 6 diversifying deals in the US and 5 such deals in Europe before GLBA was passed.
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di¤erences in abnormal returns between diversifying and focusing M&A are statistically signicant.
[Table 7]
While the absence of a positive value e¤ect associated with product diversication in Europe is in
line with our expectation that investors are more skeptical about diversifying M&A targeted at low
protection environments, we examine this argument in more detail. Table 7 presents 5-day CAR by
tercile portfolios of the quality of shareholder protection that is prevalent in the target country.
Consistent with prior expectations, investors value nancial diversication over product focus only in
the top protection tercile (i.e. only in the top tercile is the di¤erence in abnormal returns between
diversifying and focusing mergers signicant at 5%). In lower protection environments, where investors
are more likely to be expropriated, there is no value e¤ect associated with product diversication.
3.3 Geographic Diversication and Investor Protection
Table 8 reports abnormal returns to bidding banks for domestic and cross-border deals. Almost half of
all sampled merger activity in Europe involves geographic diversication. By contrast, there are no
cross-border bids by US banks in the sample.7 Whilst the vast majority of cross-border mergers in
Europe were aimed at other European institutions and frequently involved banks in closely integrated
economic regions (e.g. the Benelux countries, Scandinavia, Germany & Austria), nine of the deals were
cross-border mergers targeted at US banks.8
We have no a priori expectations about the impact of cross-border M&A on bidder wealth. On the
one hand, Cybo-Ottone and Murgia (2000) document for nancial rms and Goergen and
Renneboog (2004) for non-nancial rms that cross-border M&A generate value gains for acquiring
7Some researchers have likened inter-state mergers in the US to cross-border M&A (see DeLong, 2001). In unreported
tests, we cannot nd any di¤erences in the market reaction to inter- and intra-state M&A in the US. It is important to
bear in mind, however, that there are legal, regulatory and cultural aspects associated with M&A across country
borders most notably, changes in the investor protection environment applicable to the target that do not apply to
mergers within the US.
8The high ratio of cross-border to total M&A activity in the European banking sector reects the relatively small size
of many of those economies (compared with the US) as well as the concentrated ownership levels of banking assets (Berger
et al., 1999). The combined asset value accounted for by the ve largest banks as a percentage of all banksassets exceeds
80% in the Netherlands, Sweden and Switzerland (CEPR, 2005), thus, forestalling further domestic consolidation for
anti-trust reasons. Also, the introduction of the euro has increased political pressure on banks to form pan-European
institutions that can provide corporate banking as well as clearing and settlement services across borders more e¤ectively
and, ultimately, at lower cost to consumers (Allen and Song, 2005).
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rms in Europe. Alternatively, cross-border bank mergers do not o¤er the same potential for front- and
back o¢ ce rationalizations as domestic M&A where overlapping branch networks can be trimmed and
administrative tasks streamlined in the aftermath of a deal (DeLong, 2001). Further, both the pervasive
role of regulation (Kiymaz, 2004) and outright protectionism by some European governments (Allen
and Song, 2005; Campa and Hernando, 2004) may cause cross-border bank M&A to attract a negative
market reaction.
Table 8 presents evidence of relatively positive market revaluation e¤ects following the
announcement of cross-border bank M&A in Europe. Over the duration of the 1-, 3-, and 5-day event
window, cross-border bids create shareholder value. More specically, European cross-border deals
attract a positive market revaluation of 0.55% on the announcement day (signicant at 1% [t-test] and
5% [rank test]). The investor reaction to geographically focusing deals is less pronounced, but still a
positive 0.21% (signicant t-statistic, insignicant rank statistic). These ndings are replicated for 3-
and 5-day CAR, but not for any broader event window specications.9
However, an important aspect about cross-border mergers is that they tend to be cross-regime
mergers. Next to a transfer of legal ownership, cross-border mergers usually also entail a transfer of the
corporate governance regime that is relevant to the target when the bidders accounting and general
disclosure laws are adopted by the acquired rm in the post-merger period (Bris and Cabolis, 2004).
We, thus, expect the market reaction to cross-border M&A to be inuenced by di¤erences in the quality
of investor protection regimes between bidders and targets. Starks and Wei (2004) observe that bidders
pay a lower control premium for acquisition targets domiciled in investor protection regimes that are
less sophisticated than that of the bidder. For our sample, we posit that if acquisitions are made in the
context of protection regimes which are less sophisticated than that of the bidding bank, bidders will
realize higher announcement period returns. This is because bidding shareholders have to be
compensated for acquisitions in environments with less e¢ cient internal and external control
mechanisms.
[Table 8]
We test directly the argument that di¤erences in investor protection between merging banks have
market valuation e¤ects in cross-border M&A. Table 8 divides cross-border deals into two groups. The
9 In unreported tests, we also nd that cross-border mergers within Europe (n=15) attract higher announcement
returns than cross-border mergers between European and US banks (n=9). For 5-day CAR, mergers with US targets lead
to bidder returns of -0.05% and bidders with targets in Europe to 0.28%. However, di¤erence in announcement returns
between the two groups are not statistically signicant.
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rst group (n=11) contains acquisitions where the shareholder protection prevalent in the bidders
country is greater than that in the target country. The contrary is true for the control group (n=13),
either because targets operate within a relatively more sophisticated regime or the transaction is not a
cross-regimemerger. To assess whether cross-border mergers lead to a change in the targets e¤ective
protection regime, we adjust for bidders with cross-listings in di¤erent investor protection environments.
If bidders have multiple listings, the highest protection environment in which the acquirers shares are
traded is the e¤ective level of protection enjoyed by bidding bank shareholders.10
We nd that, with the exception of 26-day CAR, abnormal returns associated with M&A in lower
protection environments [(+)] are consistently higher than in high protection environments (). On the
announcement date, cross-border bids targeted at banks operating in lower protection regimes realize
abnormal returns of 1.34%, while cross-border bids where targets operate under a relatively more
sophisticated protection regime attract -0.28%. The di¤erence in announcement returns is statistically
di¤erent (at 5%-level) on the announcement day as well as for longer event window specications.
Consistent with prior expectations, this suggests that cross-border bank mergers create value only if
deals are targeted at environments that o¤er less investor protection (i.e. cross-regimeM&A with
targets in less advanced protection systems). Accordingly, bidding bank shareholders are compensated
for acquiring equity in an environment where the private benets of control are higher than in their own
environment. No such gains exist if bidders target a higher protection regime, as bidding bank
shareholders will not demand compensation for a higher risk of expropriation if the transparency
practices by targets are more advanced in this type of environment
3.4 Takeover Finance and Investor Protection
In Table 9 we present evidence on how the mode of takeover nance (cash, equity, or a mixture of both)
impacts upon merger announcement returns. As a percentage of total transactions, Europe has a
substantially higher share of cash-nanced takeovers (49%), compared with the US (19%). By the same
token, the share of purely equity-nanced deals is much smaller in Europe (34%) than in the US (68%).
This is consistent with Rossi and Volpin (2004) who observe for a sample of cross-border mergers that
there is a preference for all-cash bids in countries with less sophisticated rights for minority
shareholders. Against the background of an increased risk of expropriation for minority shareholders
10For example, Germanys Deutsche Bank is listed on the NYSE and, thus, complies with US disclosure rules. If
Deutsche acquires an institution in the US, this transaction is, strictly speaking, not cross-regime. Only direct listings
and, in the US, Level II and Level III ADR issues which subject bidders to stricter SEC disclosure rules qualify as
cross-listings (see Bris and Cabolis, 2004).
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under a low protection regime, target shareholders are less likely to accept the bidders equity as a
transaction currency outside the US or the UK.
[Table 9]
The use of equity as acquisition currency is believed to signal to investors that the bidders equity is
overvalued and the proposed transaction, hence, less desirable at the nancial terms o¤ered (Becher,
2000; Anderson et al., 2004). We expect that cash-nanced deals receive a more positive market
reaction than other forms of takeover nance and that any value premium associated with cash over
other forms of acquisition nance is larger in low protection regimes. The results in Table 9 show that
abnormal returns associated with all-cash bids are positive and statistically signicant in Europe (Panel
A.1) and negative and signicant in the US (Panel B.1). More fundamentally, however, the results are
broadly consistent with cash nance generating higher abnormal returns than non-cash nance in both
Europe and the US. On t=0, the di¤erence in mean abnormal returns associated with cash- and
non-cash nance deals is 1.90% in Europe and 1.38% in the US (statistically signicant at the 7%- and
1%-level, respectively). While di¤erences in the market reaction to all-cash and non-cash nance are
not statistically signicant over longer examination periods, the positive value e¤ect of cash nance
tends to be more pronounced in Europe than in the US over most event windows.
Next, we examine whether investor preference for cash-nance varies with the value of the proposed
bank merger. We dene relative bid size as the ratio of deal value to the market value of the bidders
equity in the scal year before the merger announcement. Even though abnormal returns are
statistically indistinguishable from zero and based on very small sample sizes for most subsamples, the
positive value e¤ect of cash-nance is among the strongest when European acquirers undertake low
relative value M&A (Panel A.3). Consequently, the value premium investors attach to cash nance
appears to be more pronounced when European acquirers with high market valuations initiate M&A
deals of low relative value. Moeller et al.(2004) pro¤er evidence that high-value bidding rms realize
lower announcement returns than rms with lower market valuations and suggest that investors view
the management of high valuation rms because they are less likely to be subjected to a hostile
takeover bid as more entrenched.
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4 Regression Analysis:
Bank Merger Returns and Investor Protection
We use cross-sectional regression analysis in this section to examine further the impact of the targets
investor protection regime on the market reaction to bank merger announcements. In the preceding
sections, univariate tests have demonstrated that bank bids targeted at low protection economies
(Europe) elicit a more positive market revaluation than bank M&A aimed at high protection
environments (the US). Also, we found a positive market revaluation associated with product
diversication in the US and with cash-nance in Europe. The explanation we put forward for these
ndings a negative impact of target protection laws on bidder returns is further strengthened by the
regression results in this section. Further, we analyze the e¤ects of various acquirer and deal
characteristics on bidder abnormal returns. The specication of our model is as follows:
CAR(t 2;t+2) = + 1 Investor Protection+ 2 TargetEPS+ 3 ProductFocus +4 Rel.ROE
+5 CashDummy+6 DealValue+7 Crossborder+8 NonInt.Inc.
+9 Acq.TotalCost+10 Acq.ROE+ 11Merger Program+"
(5)
The dependent variable is the estimated 5-day cumulative abnormal performance of acquiring banks
around the announcement date of a merger. As indicated above, we proxy the level of investor
protection that applies to targets by two indexes taken from La Porta et al. (1998). An index of
anti-director rights that captures the various rights that shareholders possess against management and
a second index that measures the quality of national accounting standards. The control variables in (5)
are from Worldscope and include pre-merger earnings per share (EPS) of the target and relative ROE
which is the ROE of the target divided by the ROE of the acquirer (all in t-1). Other variables are deal
value (measured as the logarithm of the dollar value of the M&A transaction), a cross-border dummy
(takes the value of 1 for acquisitions where target and acquirers are located in di¤erent countries and 0
otherwise), and product diversication (measured by a binary variable that takes the value of 1 if the
rst two digits of the four-digit SIC code of the companies in a merger are identical and 0 otherwise).
The cash-only dummy is 1 if a merger is nanced by 100% cash rather than by a mix of cash and equity
(in which case the variable is 0).Total cost are expressed on a per-employee basis and non-interest
income is measured as the share of non-interest income to the total of non-interest and interest income
(both in t-1). The latter ratio indicates the signicance of fee-generating activities versus more
traditional loan activities for a bank.
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[Table 10]
Table 10 presents di¤erent specications of our regression model. In Column 1, we exclude the
investor protection measures and estimate the coe¢ cients on various control variables instead. The
results show that bids made by protable banks (i.e. with a high return on equity) and takeovers
targeted at relatively more protable banks (as reected by a high relative ROE) are associated with
higher announcement returns. Further, consistent with the ndings of the univariate analysis, there is a
positive and signicant association between abnormal returns and cross-border acquisitions, on the one
hand, and all-cash bids, on the other.
The results in Columns 2 of Table 10 present evidence that shareholder protection has a negative
and statistically signicant impact (at less than 1%) on bidder returns during the announcement period.
Consequently, the better shareholders are protected from expropriation by managers, the lower the
abnormal returns associated with bank M&A. We would, thus, expect abnormal returns to be lower
where targets operate under a high investor protection regime (such as the US) compared with
countries where higher information asymmetry and agency costs lead to a less competitive market for
corporate control (many European economies). In the latter, bidders will nd it easier to extract
economic gains from their targets.
Further, the results in Column 2 indicate a negative association between bidder returns and the
product focus of the proposed transaction as well as between bidder returns and target earnings per
share (signicant at the 5% level). The former result conrms the market condence in diversifying
bank mergers as demonstrated by our univariate tests, while the latter result suggests that
underperforming targets o¤er opportunities for bidders to create value.
Next, we use a second index of investor protection as a robustness test. We replace shareholder
protection as a proxy for the level of investor protection in Columns 4 and 5 of Table 10 with an index
of the quality of accounting standards applying to target banks. Our results are in line with the ndings
above. Lower levels of target protection are associated with higher bidder returns. Again, product
diversication is associated with higher returns in Column 4, but the coe¢ cient loses its signicance in
Column 5 when further control variables are added. The results of this regression conrm that, next to
investor protection, relatively more protable targets and all-cash bids translate into higher market
expectations at the time of the bank merger announcement. Interestingly, the value of the announced
deals has no e¤ect on abnormal returns for any of the specications. While deal size is somewhat a
proxy for the degree of market power which newly-formed institutions are likely to enjoy, banks in our
sample do not seem to benet from this possibly because our sampling criterion of deals no smaller than
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$100 million has left us with a sample of large and very large institutions where the scope for signicant
economies of scale may be limited.
4.1 Robustness
Prior to our analysis, we veried the accuracy of the event dates supplied by Thomson Financial.
Following Moeller and Schlingemann (2005), we analyzed changes in the trading volumes of the acquirer
on the announcement date. If market-adjusted volumes increase signicantly on t=0, this is interpreted
as evidence of an accurately reported announcement date. In total, four deals have been omitted from
the sample using this technique. Next, we used di¤erent event window lengths (3-day, 11-day CAR) for
the multivariate analysis. Our main results do not change; our conclusions are, thus, not contingent on
the use of a particular event window specication.
We also examined the sensitivity of the coe¢ cient on shareholder protection for cash versus
non-cash nance. It is conceivable that our main result the negative impact of investor protection laws
on abnormal bidder returns is in fact driven by the negative impact of non-cash nance (which is more
prevalent under high protection regimes) on abnormal returns. We control for this by running the
regressions in Columns 2 - 5 in Table 10 for subsamples of cash and non-cash deals. We obtain broadly
similar results with the statistical signicance of the investor protection variable remaining at or below
5% for all specications.
Next, we classied all bank acquisitions valued at more than $1 billion as mega-mergers and
compared the resulting mean abnormal returns with those of the rest of the sample. We are indeed
unable to detect any di¤erences in CAR for di¤erent deal values. This runs contrary to the view that
mega-mergers because they create banks that are too-big-to-fail(TBTF) and, thus, entrench
management and encourage post-merger risk taking should lower the expected gains from M&A. The
lack of an observable impact of mega-mergers on announcement returns can be interpreted as either
suggesting that mergers valued at $1 billion are not large enough to cause TBTF concerns or that some
bidders might may have crossed the critical asset threshold for TBTF considerations to become e¤ective
before the focal acquisition.
Due to the dominance of US transactions in our sample, we verify that the negative relationship
between both target protection measures and bidder abnormal returns, as identied for the entire
sample in Section 2.2, also exists in a non-US context. We rank bidder performance of European deals
by return quintiles and nd shareholder protection for targets in the lowest quintile to be signicantly
higher (at 1%) than in the highest return portfolios.
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Serial acquisitions form a sizable share of M&A activities in the banking industry. For transactions
that are part of a merger program, the bidders market valuation may partly reect investor
anticipation of future bidding activity before any announcements are made. This anticipation e¤ect
may potentially depress the announcement returns that serial acquirers earn vis-à-vis rst-time bidders
(see Song and Walkling, 2006). To account for this, a binary variable (zero for rst bids and one for
second or higher order bids) is added to the multivariate regressions. The merger program dummy does
not enter the regressions at customary signicance levels indicating the absence of anticipation e¤ects
on bank merger announcement returns.
While the multivariate regressions demonstrate that shareholder protection and accounting quality
have comparable e¤ects in the market for corporate control, the indices still measure somewhat di¤erent
institutional characteristics. In Section 2.2, we have identied deals mostly targeted at civil law-based
countries like Switzerland and Germany that combine strong accounting regulations with a relatively
weak form of investor protection where the two measures point to di¤erent conclusions. We examine
whether the market reaction to M&A di¤ers in cases where the two measures do not reach a conclusive
assessment of the level of investor protection that is prevalent in the target country by using interaction
terms between a binary variable that takes the value of 1 if there is a discrepancy between the two
measures and target eps, deal value, and acquirer cost. None of the interaction terms enter our
regressions at customary signicance levels. Consequently, there is no evidence of a modied investor
reaction to bank merger announcement targeted at countries where the level of investor protection is
relatively ambiguous.
5 Concluding Remarks
Our analysis indicates that the level of investor protection enjoyed by shareholders in the target country
partly determines market expectations about merger-related performance gains at the time of large
bank merger announcements. The results suggest that the positive bidder returns in European
economies reect an optimistic market assessment of the acquirers ability to extract economic gains
from targets in a low investor protection environment. By contrast, high investor protection
regimes characterized by market-based governance, a less pronounced manager-shareholder conict
and a much more competitive market for corporate control make it more di¢ cult for bidders to realize
gains following an acquisition.
Two main implications arise from our ndings. First, the negative market assessment of bank
merger activity targeted at high investor protection economies (such as the US & UK) raises questions
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about the e¢ ciency of internal governance mechanisms. If bank mergers, on average, are to the
detriment of shareholders, why are they unable to prevent them? Future studies may nd it benecial
to examine explanations for this paradox by concentrating on bank-specic forms of investor protection
rather than on regulatory regimes at the country-level. So far, research on the governance of banking
rms and its value implications for M&A activities has only been able to identify executive
compensation as a facilitator of value creating bank mergers (see Cornett et al., 2003; Hagendor¤ et al.,
2007), leaving the role of other important governance mechanisms, such as ownership structure and
board composition, largely unexplored.
Second, the positive value e¤ects of European bank merger announcements are at odds with some
regulatory practices in the EU which prevent the consolidation of national banking sectors.11 The
positive market reaction to European cross-border mergers, in particular, shows that there are gains to
be reaped from the consolidation of banking assets. However, partly as a result of an openly hostile
environment to cross-border bank M&A in many European countries, few banks have established retail
networks across the EU. This is an important issue because it is widely believed consumers would
benet from the creation of a pan-European clearing and settlement system through substantially
reduced fees for cross-border transactions.
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Table 1 Overview of M&A Sample  
The table breaks down 204 bank M&A deals in the period 1996–2004 by transaction year and the bidder’s country of origin. 
Deal values are measured in constant 2004 $ using the US CPI. Only majority acquisitions between publicly listed banks (as 
acquirers) and financial services firms (as targets) are included. Bidders and acquisition targets are from the US and Europe 
(EU-15 plus Switzerland). The value of the acquired equity is at least $ 100 million in constant 2004 $ and all mergers were 
completed by May 2005. 
Panel A: Distribution of Acquisitions by Year 
 No. of Mergers  Total Value (mil $)  Ave Value (mil $) 
Year Total US Europe  Total US Europe  Total US Europe 
1996 11 9 (82%) 2 (18%)  10,317 4,825 (47%) 5,491 (53%)  938 536 2,746 
1997 30 24 (80%) 6 (20%)  80,988 33,791 (42%) 47,198 (58%)  2,700 1,408 7,866 
1998 32 28 (88%) 4 (12%)  258,122 237,615 (92%) 20,507 (8%)  8,066 8,486 5,127 
1999 27 18 (67%) 9 (33%)  96,377 25,012 (26%) 71,365 (74%)  3,570 1,390 7,929 
2000 29 14 (48%) 15 (52%)  83,818 38,156 (46%) 45,662 (54%)  2,890 2,725 3,044 
2001 28 19 (68%) 9 (32%)  52,048 11,380 (22%) 40,668 (78%)  1,859 599 4,519 
2002 14 11 (79%) 3 (21%)  26,545 9,952 (37%) 16,593 (63%)  1,896 905 5,531 
2003 17 14 (82%) 3 (18%)  57,330 55,852 (97%) 1,477  (3%)  3,372 3,989 492 
2004 16 14 (88%) 2 (13%)  93,899 78,001 (83%) 15,898 (17%)  5,869 5,572 7,949 
All 204 151 (74%) 53 (26%)  759,444 494,585 (65%) 264,859 (35%)  3,723 3,275 4,997 
Panel B: Distribution of Acquisitions by Country 
 
Target Nation    
Acquirer Nation BE DE FR GE GR IR IT NL PO SP SW UK  US Total 
Belgium 2     3    1 6 
Denmark  2          2 
France 1  2 1 1       1 6 
Germany    1       1 2 
Greece     7        7 
Italy      5     1 6 
Netherlands 1   1      3 5 
Portugal       2    2 
Spain       1 2  1  4 
Sweden  1          1 
Switzerland         2  1 3 
UK    1   2      5 1 9 
US             151 151 
Total 4 3 3 3 8 2 5 3 3 2 2 6 160 204 
Source: Thomson Financial, Bureau of Labor Statistics (http://stats.bls.gov). 
 Table 2 Investor Protection 
Investor protection is proxied by two indexes from La Porta et al (1998). Anti-director rights vary between 0 and 6 depending 
on the inclusion of six different voting rights as detailed below. This index is multiplied by an index of the rule of law (varying 
between 0 and 10) and called shareholder protection. Accounting standards vary from 0 to 90 depending on the inclusion of 
90 accounting items in national accounting standards 
Panel A: Index Composition 
 
Anti-director  
rights 
 
(1) What is the percentage of share capital required to call in an extraordinary shareholders' meeting? 
(2) Are proxy votes permissible or do shareholder have to be present (either personally or through an 
authorized representative) at shareholders' meetings? 
(3) Are there restrictions on selling shares around the time of meetings? 
(4) Is cumulative voting for directors permissible? Alternatively, are there other mechanisms in place 
by which minority interests name a proportional number of directors? 
(5) Do minority shareholders have legal mechanisms to fight perceived oppression? For example, 
can they insist on their shares being repurchased should they object key decisions taken by 
management? 
(6) Do shareholders have preemptive rights to new issues that protect their stake from dilution? 
   
rule of law Assessment of the law and order tradition in the country produced by the rating agency International 
Country Risk and quoted by La Porta et al. (1998). Varies between 0 and 10 where lower scores 
indicate a lower tradition for law and order. 
   
accounting  
standards 
Index constructed from company reports in different countries. Reports are examined and rated 
according to their inclusion or omission of 90 items. These items fall into seven categories (general 
information, income statements, balance sheets, funds flow statement, accounting standards, stock 
data, and special items). 
Panel B: Country Scores 
Country 
 
Shareholder Protection 
(0-60) 
Accounting Standards 
(0-90) 
Belgium  0 61 
Denmark  20 62 
France  28.95 69 
Germany  9.23 62 
Greece  14.24 55 
Ireland 31.2 n.a. 
Italy  6.75 62 
Netherlands  40 64 
Portugal  26.04 36 
Spain  31.2 64 
Sweden  30 83 
Switzerland  20 68 
United Kingdom  42.85 78 
United States  50 75 
 
 
Table 3 Interaction between Shareholder Protection and Accounting Quality 
Investor protection is proxied by two indexes from La Porta et al (1998) and multiplied by an index of the rule of law. Accounting 
standards vary from 0 to 90 depending on the inclusion of 90 accounting items in national accounting standards 
 Shareholder Protection   
  Below median Above median Total 
Below median 36 0 36 Accounting 
Quality Above median 8 160 168 
       
 Total 44 160 204 
Pearson χ2 = 158.96   (p = 0.00) 
 Table 4 Bidder Abnormal Returns  
The sample consists of 204 US and European bank acquirers between 1996 and 2004. All banks are publicly traded. Abnormal 
returns are calculated against national Datastream banks-only indexes using market model regressions that are averaged over 
each event window. Tests of statistical significance are based on standardized prediction errors, adjusted for increases in the daily 
return variance following merger announcements (Boehmer et al., 1991) and a non-parametric rank test (Corrado, 1989).  
 
Event 
window 
Ave CAR Pos. Neg. t-Test Rank test 
(t-20; t+5) -0.12% 66 138 -0.54 -3.42***
      
(t-10; t+1) -0.18% 69 135 -1.66* -2.99***
      
(t-2; t+2) -0.32% 66 138 -5.67*** -3.75***
      
(t-1; t+1) -0.50% 63 141 -13.55*** -4.61***
      
0 -0.93% 74 130 -53.45*** -5.61***
            
* (**,***) denotes significance at the 10% (5%, 1%) level. 
 
 
 
Table 5 Abnormal Returns by Region and Investor Protection Levels 
The sample consists of 204 US and European bank acquirers between 1996 and 2004. All banks are 
publicly traded. Abnormal returns are calculated against the Datastream bank sector index using market 
model regressions. Abnormal returns are averaged over each event window. Tests of statistical 
significance are based on standardized prediction errors, adjusted for increases in the daily return 
variance following merger announcements (Boehmer et al., 1991) and a non-parametric rank test 
(Corrado, 1989). 
Panel A: Abnormal Returns for European and US Bank Acquirers 
    (t-20; t+5)   (t-10; t+1)   (t-2; t+2)   (t-1; t+1)   0 
           
EUR mergers ave CAR -0.03%  0.03%  0.08%  0.09%  0.36% 
n=53 t-stat -0.21  0.85  3.12***  6.15***  40.67***
 rank stat -1.43  0.37  0.91  0.70  2.06**
           
US mergers ave CAR -0.14%  -0.25%  -0.47%  -0.70%  -1.40% 
n=151 t-stat -0.83  -2.82***  -10.17**  -24.09***  -98.18**
 rank stat -2.85***  -3.04**  -3.95**  -4.72**  -6.96**
           
Mean Diff  0.12%**  0.28%***  0.54%***  0.80%***  1.76%***
 ∆(CAR)EUR-US   (p= 0.03)   (p= 0.00)   (p=0.00)   (p=0.00)   (p=0.00) 
Panel B: Target Investor Protection Measures by Deciles, ranked by CAR(t-2; t+2)
Di ave CAR n Shareholder       
Protection 
Accounting 
Quality 
D1 (low) -2.22% 21 47.68 75.14 
D2 -1.15% 20 47.00 73.65 
D3 -0.73% 21 47.16 73.75 
D4 -0.45% 20 46.01 72.05 
D5 -0.32% 20 45.50 71.15 
D6 -0.18% 21 42.38 72.6 
D7 -0.04% 20 43.97 70.3 
D8 0.20% 21 38.23 69.75 
D9 0.47% 20 39.51 69.38 
D10 (high) 1.31% 20 30.38 67.85 
Differences in Investor Protection 
D1-D10   17.30*** 7.29***
D1-D5   2.18* 3.99**
D5-D10   15.12*** 3.30**
* (**,***) denotes significance at the 10% (5%, 1%) level. Paired t-tests are used to determine differences 
in mean returns and assume unequal variances.  
 Table 6 Abnormal Returns for Product-Focusing and Diversifying Mergers 
The sample consists of 204 US and European bank acquirers between 1996 and 2004. All banks are publicly traded. Abnormal returns are 
calculated against national Datastream bank-sector indexes using market model regressions. Abnormal returns are averaged over each 
event window. Tests of statistical significance are based on standardized prediction errors, adjusted for increases in the daily return 
variance following merger announcements (Boehmer et al., 1991), and a non-parametric rank test (Corrado, 1989). Acquirers are 
commercial banks, bank holding companies, credit institutions, and savings banks. Targets are also insurance companies (life and non-life), 
mortgage bankers, as well as security brokers and flotation companies. Product-focusing mergers involve banks where the first two digits of 
the four-digit SIC code of their main product line are identical. 
 Full Sample (n=204)  US (n=151)  Europe (n=53) 
 Focusing Diversifying ∆(CAR)  Focusing Diversifying ∆(CAR)  Focusing Diversifying ∆(CAR) 
            
n 164 40   130 21   34 19  
            
(t-20; t+5) -0.12% -0.10% 0.02%  -0.15% -0.11% 0.04%  0.01% -0.09% -0.10% 
 (-0.5860) (-1.434) p=0.76  (-0.8758) (-2.6059)*** p=0.59  (0.1640) (-1.4482) p=0.26 
 [-2.7936]*** [-2.2154]**   [-2.3654]*** [-2.4769]**   [-1.2943] [-0.4929]  
(t-10; t+1) -0.20% -0.08% 0.13%  -0.27% -0.15% 0.12%  0.04% 0.01% -0.03% 
 (-2.0656)** (-1.961)** p=0.11  (-3.1936)*** (-5.2912)*** p=0.29  (1.6500) (-0.0127) p=0.85 
 [-2.9017]*** [-0.8463]   [-2.7772]*** [-1.8616] *   [-0.2257] [0.7459]  
(t-2; t+2) -0.39% -0.04% 0.35%  -0.50% -0.20% 0.31%  0.05% 0.14% 0.09% 
 (-7.7265)*** (-2.161)** p=0.03
**
 (-12.172)*** (-10.217)*** p=0.10
*
 (4.4986)*** (4.1068) *** p=0.79 
 [-3.8025]*** [-0.5211]   [-3.7528]*** [-1.8484]*   [0.0305] [1.1834]  
(t-1; t+1) -0.61% -0.03% 0.57%  -0.79% -0.17% 0.61%  0.08% 0.12% 0.09% 
 (-18.868)*** (-3.716)*** p=0.01
***  (-29.468)*** (-16.090)*** p=0.02
**  (10.413)*** (5.2516) *** p=0.93 
 [-4.8561]*** [-0.1238]   [-4.7432]*** [-1.3040]   [-0.1804] [1.1359]  
0 -1.16% -0.03% 1.14%  -1.60% -0.15% 1.45%  0.50% 0.11% -0.39% 
 (-70.450)*** (-29.07)*** p=0.04
**
 (-124.09)*** (-21.54)*** p=0.09
*
 (97.811)*** (-65.609)*** p=0.68 
 [-5.8409]*** [-0.5246]   [-6.0600]*** [-1.9766]**   [1.3340] [1.2966]  
* (**,***) denotes significance at the 10% (5%, 1%) level. Paired t-tests are used to determine differences in means and assume
variances. t-Statistics are in parentheses (…) and rank statistics in square brackets […]. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7 The Diversification Effect by Shareholder Protection Quality, CAR(t-2; t+2)
Five-day abnormal returns (market model) are presented for three portfolios depending on the quality of shareholder protection (La 
Porta et al., 1998). Shareholder protection applies to targets and is based on an index of anti-director rights (varying between 0 and 6) 
multiplied by an index of the rule of law (varying between 0 and 10). Product-focusing mergers involve banks where the first two digits of 
the four-digit SIC code of their main product line are identical. Paired t-tests are used to determine differences in means and assume 
unequal variances. 
 
Low Protection 
(0 – 20)  
Medium Protection 
(21 – 40)  
High Protection 
(41 – 60) 
 Focusing Diversifying ∆(CAR)  Focusing Diversifying ∆(CAR)  Focusing Diversifying ∆(CAR) 
            
n 16 9   9 4   139 27  
            
Ave CAR 0.31% 0.13% -0.18%  -0.24% -0.10% 0.14%  -0.48% -0.08% 0.40%**
t-Test 26.51*** 0.21 p=0.81  -24.88*** -10.33*** p=0.59  -11.12*** -2.90*** p=0.02 
Rank test 2.21** 0.48   -0.25 -0.32   -3.89*** -0.73  
* (**,***) denotes significance at the 10% (5%, 1%) level. 
 
Table 8 Abnormal Returns of Domestic and Cross-border Bank Mergers 
The sample consists of 204 US and European bank acquirers between 1996 and 2004. All banks are publicly traded. Abnormal returns are calculated against national 
Datastream bank-sector indexes using market model regressions. Abnormal returns are averaged over each event window. There are no cross-border mergers by US acquirers. 
Tests of statistical significance are based on standardized prediction errors, adjusted for increases in the daily return variance following merger announcements (Boehmer et al., 
1991) and non-parametric rank tests (Corrado, 1989). A merger is classified as domestic if both banks are chartered in the same country and cross-border if the acquirer and the 
target are based in different countries. (+) [(-)] indicates cross-border mergers where bidders have higher (lower) shareholder protection values than targets. 
  Europe   US         
  
 domestic   cross-border  domestic  cross-border 
 Cross-border CAR: 
Target in Lower 
Protection Regime?    
 Ave CAR 
t-test    
rank test  Ave CAR
t-test    
rank test  Ave CAR 
t-test    
rank test  Ave CAR 
t-test   
rank test 
 
(+) (–) ∆(CAR) 
CAR(+)-CAR(-)
  
∆(CAR) 
EURd-EURcb
 
                  
n 29   24   151   0   11 13    
                  
(t-20; t+5)
-0.04% 
0.0880 
 -1.2960  -0.02% -1.42986  
-0.14% -0.8283  
-2.8538***  –   – 
 0.01% -0.02% 0.02% 
(p=0.68)  
-0.04%  
(p=0.81) 
          –   –       
(t-10; t+1)
0.03% 
1.6677 
 0.0895  0.02% 
0.5509 
 0.4060  
-0.25% -2.8205***
-3.036***  –   – 
 0.10% -0.01% 0.17%* 
(p=0.07) 
 0.01%  
(p=0.7662) 
          –   –       
(t-2; t+2) 
0.08% 
3.1734*** 
0.3430  0.08% 
6.2230***
0.8441  -0.47% 
-10.169*** 
 -3.9482***  –   – 
 0.35% -0.25% 0.60%*** 
(p=0.01) 
 0.01%   
(p=0.97) 
          –   –       
(t-1; t+1) 0.07% 8.6403***  
0.2793 
 0.12% 8.8564*** 
0.6309 
 -0.70% -24.0877***  
-4.7168***
 
–   – 
 0.42% -0.23% 0.66%** 
(p=0.04) 
 -0.05%  
(p=0.90) 
          –   –       
0 0.21% 56.7957** 
0.6633 
 0.55% 58.0037*** 
0.005**
 -1.40% -98.1771***  
-6.0955***
 
–   – 
1.34% -0.28% 1.62%** 
(p=0.05) 
 -0.33%  
(p=0.73) 
                             
(**,***) denotes significance at the 10% (5%, 1%) level. Paired t-tests are used to determine differences in means assuming unequal variances. 
 Table 9 Method of Payment and Announcement Returns 
The sample consists of 204 US and European bank acquirers between 1996 and 2004. All banks are publicly traded. Abnormal 
returns are calculated against Datastream bank sector indexes using market model regressions. Abnormal returns are averaged 
over each event window. Tests of statistical significance are based on standardized prediction errors, adjusted for increases in the 
daily return variance following merger announcements (Boehmer et al., 1991), and a non-parametric rank test (Corrado, 1989). 
Transactions that were completely paid for in cash are classified as all-cash bids with the remaining deals (equity, mixed finance) 
classified as ‘not all-cash’. Relative bid size is the deal value divided by the bidder’s market capitalization at the end of the fiscal 
year prior to the merger announcement. Bid sizes above and below the sample mean are examined separately. 
      (t-20; t+5)   (t-10; t+1)   (t-2; t+2)   (t-1; t+1)   0 
Panel A : European M&A  
A.1 All European Deals    
 all-cash (n=26)  0.06% 0.03%** 0.32%*** 0.42%***/†  1.33%***/†
 not all-cash (n=27)  -0.11% 0.02% -0.15%*** -0.22%***  -0.57%
     
  ∆(CAR)c-n 0.18%* 0.00% 0.47% 0.64%  1.90%*
A.2 Rel. bid size>mean   
 all-cash (n=6)  0.34% 0.18% 0.81%† 0.91%  2.32%
 not all-cash (n=21)  -0.12% 0.05% -0.16% -0.22%  -0.22%
     
  ∆(CAR)c-n 0.46% 0.13% 0.97% 1.13%  2.54%
A.3 Rel. bid size<mean   
 all-cash (n=20)  -0.02% -0.02% 0.17% 0.27%  1.04%
 not all-cash (n=6)  -0.09% -0.06% -0.12% -0.22%  -1.79%
     
  ∆(CAR)c-n 0.07% 0.04% 0.29%* 0.49%**  2.83%**
     
Panel B: US M&A  
B.1 All US Deals    
 all-cash (n=19)  -0.15%** -0.29%*** -0.27%*** -0.37%***  -0.19%***
 not all-cash (n=132)  -0.15%*** -0.25%***/† -0.49%***/† -0.75%***/†  -1.57%***/†
     
  ∆(CAR)c-n -0.01% -0.04% 0.21% 0.38%**  1.38%***
B.2 Rel. bid size>mean   
 all-cash (n=4)  -0.01% -0.57% -0.09% 0.04%  0.70%
 not all-cash (n=57)  -0.15%** -0.24%*** -0.46%***/† -0.76%***/†  -1.70%
     
  ∆(CAR)c-n 0.15% -0.34% 0.37% 0.80%  2.40%
B.3 Rel. bid size<mean   
 all-cash (n=15)  -0.19% -0.21% -0.32% -0.48%**  -0.43%
 not all-cash (n=75)  -0.14%***/† -0.25%***/† -0.50%***/† -0.74%***/†  -1.47%***/†
     
  ∆(CAR)c-n -0.05% 0.04% 0.18% 0.26%  1.05%*
(**,***) denotes significance at the 10% (5%, 1%) level based on t-tests (assuming unequal variances) and † 
denotes significance of at least 5% according to a rank test. 
 
Table 10 Regressions: Abnormal Returns and Investor Protection 
 
The table reports least squares regressions of the effect of investor protection and control variables on bidders’ 5-
day cumulative abnormal returns in percentage points. The sample consists of 204 commercial banks in the US 
and Europe (EU-15 plus Switzerland) that announced majority acquisitions in the period 1996 – 2004. Abnormal 
returns are calculated against national Datastream bank sector indexes and averaged over (t-2;t+2) days 
surrounding the announcement date. The 5-day CAR are regressed against investor protection proxies in the target 
country and a vector of controlling variables. Shareholder protection is an index of anti-director rights multiplied by 
an index if the quality of law enforcement (both from La Porta et al., 1998) and accounting standards capture the 
quality of local disclosure practices of accounting information (also from La Porta et al., 1998). The control variables 
are from the Worldscope database. They include earnings per share of the target (EPS), return on equity (ROE); 
relative ROE is the ROE of the target divided by the ROE of the acquirer (all in t-1). Deal values are the logarithm of 
the dollar value of the M&A transaction; cross-border is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for acquisitions 
where target and acquirers are located in different countries; product focus is measured by a binary variable that 
takes the value of 1 if the first two digits of the four-digit SIC code of the companies in a merger are identical and 0 
otherwise. The cash-only dummy is 1 if a transaction is 100% cash-financed and 0 otherwise. Total costs are 
expressed on a per-employee basis and non-interest income is measured as the share of non-interest income to 
the total of non-interest and interest income (in t-1).  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Shareholder Protection  -0.168*** -0.202***   
  (0.057) (0.071)   
Accounting Standards    -0.025** -0.031** 
    (0.011) (0.015) 
Target EPS t-1 -0.104* -0.033** -0.160** -0.027* -0.087 
 (0.06) (0.016) (0.066) (0.016) (0.064) 
Product Focus -0.189 -0.328* -0.268 -0.394** -0.436 
 (0.263) (0.192) (0.314) (0.195) (0.32) 
Rel. ROE 0.911***  0.733**  0.783** 
 (0.309)  (0.361)  (0.37) 
Cash-only dummy 0.603**  0.468  0.773*** 
 (0.263)  (0.307)  (0.279) 
Deal value -0.039  0.043   
 (0.078)  (0.088)   
Cross-border dummy 0.706**  1.206***   
 (0.345)  (0.451)   
Non-interest income t-1 -0.12e-7*  -0.3e-7***  -0.1e-7 
 (0.07e-7)  (0.1e-7)  (0.1e-7) 
Acquirer total cost t-1   0.158  -0.035 
   (0.256)  (0.253) 
Acquirer ROEt-1 5.819***     
 (1.911)     
Constant -1.595** 0.748** 0.141 1.830** 1.816 
 (0.657) (0.298) (0.782) (0.79) (1.479) 
      
Observations 192 194 187 194 192 
R-squared 19.70 7.00 24.60 5.40 15.80 
Standard errors are heteroskedasticity-robust and reporte  in parentheses. *  d
Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
 
 
 
 
